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It is refreshing to find interest and dedication in the formulation of general laws of human behavior at a time when 
psychological research has become highly specialized. Sedikides and Skowronski's article is timely in bringing to light a 
potential common ground for understanding research findings in cognitive, social, and clinical psychology. Their in- 
terpretations of past research findings in terms of the principle of cognitive structure activation seem well-founded and their 
speculations regarding its implications are reasonable. Obviously, attempting to establish such breadth in the applicability 
of the principle necessarily limits the amount of depth with which any one application can be pursued. If psychology is 
to benefit from the formulation of general principles, however, it is important that these principles do more than simply 
explain a wide variety of past empirical findings. Such principles should also offer us greater depth in our understanding of a 
given phenomenon and new paths for investigation. 
One critical question is whether the law of cognitive structure activation offers a more complete understanding of de- 
pression and psychotherapy and new avenues for empirical investigation. Sedikides and Skowronski point to the usefulness 
of the cognitive-structure-activation hypothesis in explaining the intrusive and uncontrollable nature of depressive thought, 
as represented in the recent work of Bargh and Tota (1988) and Moretti and Shaw (1989). They also suggest that the principle 
of cognitive structure activation is central to understanding the efficacy of psychotherapy. I agree with Sedikides and 
Skowronski's position on the usefulness of the principle of cognitive structure activation for furthering our understanding in 
this area, although I dis- agree with some of their statements regarding the implications of this principle for psychotherapy. 
The following discussion extends their analysis and presents some alternative positions regarding the applicability of the 
principle for understanding depression and psychotherapy. 
 
Extending the Cognitive Model of Depression 
 
The Development of Vulnerability to Depression 
 
A fundamental criticism of the cognitive model of depression is that it provides a relatively weak theoretical basis for 
understanding the development of vulnerability to depression. According to Beck (1967, 1976), vulnerability to depression 
results from the development of pathogenic cognitive structures or schemata about the self, the world, and the future that 
develop early in life in response to acutely stressful experiences such as loss or rejection. The early development of these 
structures is critical because once established they influence subsequent processing of information with regard to the self. 
Beck (1967, 1976) has not substantially elaborated on this basic model, perhaps because the focus of cognitive therapy is 
on the present status of the individual's functioning rather than on the antecedents of the condition. 
Our understanding of the principle of cognitive structure activation in conjunction with advances in our understanding of 
cognitive  development during infancy through to adulthood provide a good foundation for understanding the development 
of pathological cognitive structures. Research on cognitive structure activation indicates that information that is presented 
frequently, consistently, clearly, and significantly results in the development of highly accessible constructs (Higgins, 1989b; 
Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985; Higgins & King, 1981). 
Developmental shifts in mental representational capacity have been well documented by researchers (Case, 1985). Shifts 
in children's capacity to cognitively represent the relation between events may be related to developmental shifts in cognitive 
representations of the self (Higgins, 1989a; Moretti & Higgins, 1990). For example, infants are unable to cognitively 
differentiate themselves from others and therefore are incapable of distinguishing between events related to the self and those 
that are not (Case, 1985; Kagan, 1984). In contrast, a 2-year-old has the capacity for symbolic representation and can consider 
the relation between his or her behavior (self-as-object) and the reaction of another individual to this behavior (other-as-object; 
Case, 1985). Various experiences will, therefore, have differing effects on the developing self-concept in children at these two 
levels of cognitive development. 
When we combine our understanding of the factors that contribute to construct accessibility with our understanding of 
cognitive development, we can make specific predictions concerning the impact of exposure to self-related information on the 
development of self-representation. A general prediction is that exposure to negative self-related information frequently, 
consistently, clearly, and significantly during childhood will result in the development of highly accessible negative self-
constructs and therefore heightened vulnerability to depression. A more specific prediction is that exposure to negative 
self-related information frequently, consistently, clearly, and significantly during infancy will have a different impact on the 
formation of pathological elements of self-representation than the presentation of the same information in early childhood when 
the critical foundations of a cognitive representation of the self may be formed. 
In summary, our understanding of cognitive structure activation and cognitive development provides the basis for 
specific formulations and predictions concerning the development of vulnerability to depression. Itis hoped that models such 
as that offered by Moretti and Higgins ( 1990) will lead to a more complete understanding of the development of 
vulnerability to depression. 
 
 
Assessing Vulnerability to Depression 
 
Beck (1967, 1976) proposed that, once formed, dysfunctional schemata about the self, the world, and the future may lie 
dormant until activated by stressful experiences in adulthood. Remission from depression may simply mark the point at which 
dysfunctional schemata become dormant. In both cases, latent dysfunctional schemata about the self, the world, and the future 
represent vulnerability markers for first-episode depression or relapse into depression. 
Many critics of cognitive theories of depression have argued that the information-processing features of depression are 
simply correlates of the disorder which disappear when the disorder remits. This concern was initially voiced by Coyne and 
Gotlib (1983), based on their review of the literature, and more recently reiterated by Barnett and Gotlib (1988). If cognitive 
features of depression, such as intrusive negative thoughts, simply co-occur with the disorder and are not present prior to or 
following the depressive episode, they are of limited importance in understanding the etiology and recurrent course of the 
illness. Yet, if we adopt the cognitive model of depression, it is reasonable to expect that some information-processing 
features of depression will disappear with remission because pathological cognitive structures be- come latent and inactive. If 
the cognitive model of depression is valid, researchers should be able to demonstrate the existence of latent dysfunctional 
cognitive structures in individuals who are vulnerable to depression or relapse into depression. To date, research has failed to 
provide such evidence (Barnett & Gotllib, 1988). 
The principle of cognitive structure activation provides a basis for developing new methodologies to evaluate the hy- 
pothesis that latent dysfunctional cognitive structures in- crease vulnerability to depression. By utilizing priming ma- 
nipulations we can activate supposedly latent dysfunctional constructs and evaluate the effect of their heightened ac- 
cessibility on information processing (see Higgins, 1989b, for a discussion of priming effects). One would predict that the 
priming of latent dysfunctional cognitive structures in remitted depressives should produce information-processing 
characteristics typically seen in depression. The application of the principle of cognitive structure activation, then, allows us to 
move concepts that have been central in our theories of depression into a realm where they are very open to empirical evaluation. 
 
Understanding the Intrusive and Persistent Nature of Depressive Information-Processing 
 
The principle of cognitive structure activation may also explain the intrusive and persistent nature of depressive in- 
formation-processing. Research indicates that subjects need not be aware of a construct that they hold or of the priming of the 
construct in order for it to influence information processing (Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986; Bargh & Pietromonaco, 
1982). These findings suggest that it is very likely that depressed individuals are unaware of the dysfunctional constructs that 
they hold, or of the types of situations that prime the accessibility of these constructs. If this is the case, depressives should 
experience their negative thoughts as intrusive and unpredictable. This is indeed supported by clinical observations indicating 
that depressed individuals often complain that their negative thoughts have a life of their own-they intrude without warning and 
persist despite at- tempts to banish them from awareness. 
Research has also indicated that the influence of highly accessible constructs on information processing is extremely 
difficult to inhibit, particularly when attentional resources are limited (Bargh, 1984; Bargh & Pratto, 1986; Logan, 1985; 
Uleman, 1987). In fact, instructions to inhibit or sup- press thoughts that result from the activation of constructs may actually 
increase the frequency of these not-to-be- thought-about thoughts (Fennell & Teasdale, 1984; Wegner & Schneider, 1989; 
Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). These findings may help to explain why the capacity of depressives for 
controlling their negative thought processes appears to be reduced when they are confronted with situations that impinge on 
attentional resources. 
Moretti and Shaw (1989) suggested that attentional re- sources are likely to be taxed in situations that are affectively 
charged and/or highly complex. The heightened level of physiological arousal associated with affect may impinge on 
attentional resources (Kim & Baron, 1988) and increase the accessibility of similarly valenced constructs (Higgins & King, 
1981; Isen, 1984; Johnson & Tversky, 1983). In highly complex situations, individuals must attend to a multitude of factors, 
thereby reducing available attentional resources. Demands on limited attentional resources will increase the likelihood that 
information will be processed automatically and will decrease the likelihood that individuals will be able to interrupt or inhibit 
these processes. Thus, a reasonable pre- diction is that depressives are more likely to manifest dysfunctional information 
processing in situations that are affectively charged and/or highly complex. 
Sedikides and Skowronski offer passing comments on the applicability of the law of cognitive structure activation for 
understanding other types of psychological disorders such as obsessive-compulsive disorder and problems of loneliness. 
Although I agree that this principle may indeed have much to offer in these domains, the applicability of this principle in each 
of these areas should be carefully thought through before such claims are made. In the past, psychopathology researchers 
have been too quick to adopt new concepts, such as the schema concept, that superficially offered new perspectives but later 
proved less productive (Segal, 1988; Spielman & Bargh, 1990). 
 
 
Conceptualizing Psychotherapy From a Construct-Accessibility  Perspective 
 
Our understanding of the development and operation of cognitive structures suggests that several therapeutic strategies 
may be helpful in altering cognitive structure operation. First, as we have noted the existence and influence of cognitive 
structures on information processing occurs largely without awareness. An obvious first step in the therapeutic change process 
is to help patients become aware of self-relevant constructs and their effect on information processing. This process can often 
be facilitated by asking patients to carefully monitor changes in their feelings states, and use these changes as cues to examine 
thought processes that may be occurring outside of immediate awareness (Moreitr,-"Fe1cf.. man, & Shaw, 1990; Moretti & Shaw, 
1989). 
 
The identification of dysfunctional cognitive processes can be therapeutic in and of itself; however, most patients require 
further assistance in altering dysfunctional patterns of knowledge accessibility. Moretti, Higgins, and Feldman (1990) 
outlined several methods for altering cognitive-structure representation and operation. These include (a) changing patterns 
of construct availability and (b) changing pat- terns of construct accessibility. 
 
Changing Patterns of Construct Availability 
 
Cognitive, behavioral, and psychodynamic techniques can be effectively employed to introduce new information into 
self-representation. For example, new information can be introduced into the self-system by exposing patients to new 
situations (e.g., assertiveness training groups) or help- ing them to attend to particular types of experiences they typically 
ignore because such experiences are not considered within of the realm of self-definition (e.g., cognitive therapy techniques of 
monitoring mastery and pleasure). Identifying core self-beliefs that are based on significant early experiences and helping 
patients to work through the meaning of these beliefs can often remove long-held restrictions on self-definition and 
encourage development in new directions. These diverse therapeutic strategies share the common goal of helping patients 
have access to new experiences that can lead to the development of new, psychologically healthy self- constructs. 
 
Changing Patterns of Construct Accessibility 
 
The accessibility of existing constructs can be increased or decreased. As Sedikides and Skowronski point out, fre- 
quently activating positive constructs may effectively reduce depression. It is also reasonable to assume that decreasing the 
accessibility of negative self-related constructs will be equally effective in reducing depression. 
Numerous therapeutic strategies can be utilized to increase the accessibility of positive constructs or decrease the ac- 
cessibility of negative constructs (Moretti, Higgins, & Feld- man, 1990). Cognitive therapists can help depressed patients 
increase the amount of attention they devote to reviewing positive self-related constructs and limit the amount of attention 
spent dwelling on and generalizing from negative self-related information. This can be achieved by training patients to 
immediately identify and challenge negative self-related thoughts once they enter awareness, thus ensuring the equal 
activation of positive and negative self-related constructs. 
Memories of significant events may serve as chronic activators of dysfunctional self-constructs. Psychodynamic in- 
terventions that help patients work through these experiences can often assist in eliminating this pattern or significantly 
reducing the extent to which these memories prime the accessibility of dysfunctional constructs. For example, an adult may 
recall painful memories of being criticized or ignored as a child. Psychodynamic psychotherapy may help this patient work 
through the affect associated with these memories and come to realize that these events may have occurred because of the 
limited resources of parents rather than because of the individual's personal defects. This type of change would significantly 
alter the power of these memories to prime negative self-related constructs. 
Sedikides and Skowronski argue that "new adaptive cognitive structures can be achieved without dramatic changes in the 
patient's everyday routine." Itis important to note, how- ever, that day-to-day activities are likely to be filled with events 
and information that frequently prime, and thereby maintain, dysfunctional accessibility patterns. It is therefore unlikely that 
change can occur unless intervention strategies offer at least equally frequent priming of adaptive cognitive constructs. Once-
a-week priming of positive constructs is simply not sufficient to support adaptive cognitive structures in withstanding a 
dysfunctional and distressing environment. In such situations, therapists are wise to encourage their patients to make 
behavioral changes in their lives that will increase positive-construct accessibility and decrease negative-construct 
accessibility. This in effect broadens the therapeutic base that supports and maintains change in construct accessibility. 
Sometimes behavioral interventions of this nature cannot be introduced and, in these circumstances, it may be wise to 
offer more frequent therapeutic contact to ensure changes in construct accessibility. 
It is important to keep in mind that self-related constructs may be structurally interconnected so that altering the ac- 
cessibility of any one construct may alter the accessibility of other related constructs (Higgins, VanHook, & Dorfman, 1988). 
If this is indeed the case, therapists need to recognize that their interventions may have quite broad and sometimes unexpected 
effects on the pattern of construct accessibility within the self-system. The application of interventions de- signed to alter 
the accessibility of self-related constructs should therefore be guided by a thorough understanding of a patient's system of 
self-representation. 
 
In summary, the principle of cognitive structure activation appears to be quite useful in helping researchers and clinicians 
understand and begin to answer critical questions about depression and psychotherapy. Sedikides and Skowronski's article and, 
I hope, this commentary-present some interesting directions for depression researchers to pursue. Whether the principle 
will be of value in understanding other disorders remains to be demonstrated. 
 
Note 
 
Marlene M. Moretti, Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, V5A 1S6, Canada. 
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